Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to examine the institutional context of the entrepreneurial discovery of blockchain applications.
Design/methodology/approach
This paper draws on institutional and entrepreneurial theory to introduce the economic problem entrepreneurship in the early stages of new technologies, examines the diversity of self-governed hybrid solutions to coordinating entrepreneurial information and draws policy implications.
Findings
To perceive a valuable and actionable market opportunity, entrepreneurs must coordinate distributed non-price information under uncertainty with others. One potential class of transaction cost economising solution to this problem is private self-governance of information coordination within hybrids. This paper explores a diverse range of entrepreneurial hybrids coalescing around blockchain technology, with implications for innovation policy.
Originality/value
This paper points to the problem of how the defining of the innovation problem as either choice-theoretic or contract-theoretic changes the remit of innovation policy. Innovation policy and blockchain policy should extend beyond correcting sub-optimal investments or removing barriers to action, to incorporate how polices impact entrepreneurial choices over governance structures to coordinate information.
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3. Allen, D.W.E. (2019), “Entrepreneurial exit: developing the cryptoeconomy”, in Swan, M., Potts, J., Takagi, S., Tasco, P. and Witte, F. (Eds), Blockchain Economics, World Scientific, London, pp. 197-214.
Cited by
12 articles.
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