Abstract
According to normative theories, reward-maximizing agents should have consistent preferences. Thus, when faced with alternatives A, B, and C, an individual preferring A to B and B to C should prefer A to C. However, it has been widely argued that humans can incur losses by violating this axiom of transitivity, despite strong evolutionary pressure for reward-maximizing choices. Here, adopting a biologically plausible computational framework, we show that intransitive (and thus economically irrational) choices paradoxically improve accuracy (and subsequent economic rewards) when decision formation is corrupted by internal neural noise. Over three experiments, we show that humans accumulate evidence over time using a “selective integration” policy that discards information about alternatives with momentarily lower value. This policy predicts violations of the axiom of transitivity when three equally valued alternatives differ circularly in their number of winning samples. We confirm this prediction in a fourth experiment reporting significant violations of weak stochastic transitivity in human observers. Crucially, we show that relying on selective integration protects choices against “late” noise that otherwise corrupts decision formation beyond the sensory stage. Indeed, we report that individuals with higher late noise relied more strongly on selective integration. These findings suggest that violations of rational choice theory reflect adaptive computations that have evolved in response to irreducible noise during neural information processing.
Funder
British Academy/ Leverhulme Trust
EC | European Research Council
Leverhulme Trust
Economic and Social Research Council
Research Councils UK
German-Israeli Foundation for Scientific Research and Development
Wellcome Trust
Publisher
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Reference43 articles.
1. Keeney RL Raiffa H (1976) Decisions with Multiple Objectives: Preferences and Value Tradeoffs (Wiley, New York)
2. Elimination by aspects: A theory of choice.
3. Does the brain calculate value?
4. A framework for studying the neurobiology of value-based decision making
5. Von Neumann J Morgenstern O (1947) Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (Princeton Univ Press, Princeton), 2nd Ed
Cited by
105 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献