Abstract
The function of law and of constitutional law is to make determinate what we ought to
do. And in constitutional law, that is true of both structural provisions and rights
provisions. It is not the function of constitutions to establish our real moral
rights. We possess those independently of the constitution, which cannot affect them.
And all organs of government are bound morally if not legally by those rights. I have
taken no position on the relative competence of legislatures and courts to ascertain
the content of real moral rights, and it is possible that the judiciary is
well-equipped to be our wise Platonic guardians. However, if the game is
interpretation, all that can be interpreted are authored rules, and what those rules
mean can only be what their authors meant by them. Anything else is
reauthoring—that is, creating new rules. There is no “living tree
constitutional interpretation. The only “living trees are the judges. So
you’d better hope that they are well cultivated. And you may conclude that a
bit of pruning is in order.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Cited by
10 articles.
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