Executive Pay: Board Reciprocity Counts

Abstract

AbstractWe study the influence of the corporate board network on executive pay for 3,395 US firms between 1990 and 2015. We identify three elementary structures through which the interlocking network reflects forms of inter-group reciprocity across firms: restricted exchange, when two executives sit on each other’s respective boards; delayed exchange, when y sits on the board of x after the end of x’s mandate on the board of y; and generalized exchange, when x sits on the board of y, who sits on the board of z, who sits on the board of x. These ties, which are overrepresented, are related to higher executive pay, but are not related to firm performance, which we interpret as a form of rent extraction. We use the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) as a natural experiment to confirm our results. The impact on pay disappears after 2004, once these types of exchanges are constrained.