On Translating Religious Reasons: Rawls, Habermas, and the Quest for a Neutral Public Sphere

Abstract

AbstractThrough a critical analysis of the positions of Rawls and Habermas, the article argues against the proviso that religious language be “translated” into an allegedly neutral vocabulary as a condition for full inclusion within public political reasoning. Defending and expanding the analysis of Maeve Cooke, it maintains that both Habermas and Rawls mischaracterize the nature of religious reasons in relation to reasons alleged to be “freestanding,” “secular,” or “postmetaphysical.” Reflection on the origins of religious discourse and the component thought to be retained when such discourse is “translated” demonstrates the untenability of a sharp distinction between “rational” and “religious” discourse on matters pertaining to morality. The article nonetheless affirms the need for common acceptance of the justificatory language of coercive political policies, but contends that this language is best conceived as a historically evolving wide (not universal) agreement, and as a confluence of various types of agreement.