Author:
BEDDOR BOB,GOLDSTEIN SIMON
Abstract
AbstractWhat is it to believe something might be the case? We develop a puzzle that creates difficulties for standard answers to this question. We go on to propose our own solution, which integrates a Bayesian approach to belief with a dynamic semantics for epistemic modals. After showing how our account solves the puzzle, we explore a surprising consequence: virtually all of our beliefs about what might be the case provide counterexamples to the view that rational belief is closed under logical implication.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
Logic,Philosophy,Mathematics (miscellaneous)
Cited by
17 articles.
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1. Unsettled belief;The Philosophical Quarterly;2024-05-14
2. Thinking, Guessing, and Believing;Philosophers' Imprint;2022-04-19
3. Epistemic Contradictions Do Not Threaten Classical Logic;Acta Analytica;2022-02-08
4. The restrictor view, without covert modals;Linguistics and Philosophy;2021-05-31
5. A strictly stronger relative
must;Thought: A Journal of Philosophy;2021-02-02