An evolutionary game analysis of digital transformation of multiagents in digital innovation ecosystems

Abstract

In an innovation ecosystem, the digital transformation decisions and game mechanisms of entities are paramount issues to be studied. Consequently, this study constructs a digital transformation SD evolutionary game model based on expectancy theory and Lyapunov’s first law to address the above issues. The results demonstrate the following: (1) Digital technology empowerment benefits, spillover effects, and supervision benefits are positively correlated with the willingness of the three players to engage in digital transformation; (2) Regardless of how the initial will of the players changes, the decision of the evolutionary game system is ultimately stable in (empower, transform, supervise). Compared with governments, platform centers, and nodal enterprises have a stronger will for digital transformation. However, the governments’ will is the key to the convergence speed of the game system to the equilibrium point. (3) If the static/dynamic spillover effect can cover the transformation loss, even if the transformation profits of nodal enterprises are negative, nodal enterprises will still choose the game strategy of "transformation". When the government subsidies are less than the initial value of 2, the game system has two possible strategy choices: (empower, nontransform, nonsupervise) and (empower, transform, supervise). As such, this study can fill the research gaps and address the barriers to digital transformation among stakeholders.