Little fast, little slow, should I stay or should I go? Adapting cognitive control to local-global temporal prediction across typical development

Abstract

Adaptive cognitive control (CC), the ability to adjust goal-directed behavior according to changing environmental demand, can be instantiated bottom-up by implicit knowledge, including temporal predictability of task-relevant events. In S1-S2 tasks, either local (trial-by-trial hazard expectation) or global (block-by-block expectation) temporal information can induce prediction, allowing for proactive action control. Recent developmental evidence showed that adaptive CC based on global temporal prediction emerges earlier than when it is based on the local one only. However, very little is known about how children learn to dynamically adjust behavior on the fly according to changing global predictive information. Addressing this issue is nevertheless crucial to unravel the mechanisms underlying adaptive CC flexibility. Here we used a modified version of the Dynamic Temporal Prediction task to investigate how typically developing younger (6–8 years) and older children (9–11 years), adolescents (12–15 years) and adults (21–31 years) use global prediction to shape adaptive CC over time. Specifically, the short-long percentage of S2 preparatory intervals was manipulated list-wide to create a slow-fast-slow-fast fixed block sequence and test how efficiently the response speed adapted accordingly. Overall, results revealed that in all groups behavioral performance is successfully adjusted as a function of global prediction in the late phase of the task (block 3 to 4). Remarkably, only adolescents and adults exhibit an early adaptation of adaptive CC (block 1 to 2), while children younger than 11 show sluggish ability in inferring implicit changes in global predictive rules. This age-related dissociation suggests that, although being present from an early age, adaptive CC based on global predictive information needs more developmental space to become flexible in an efficient way. In the light of a neuroconstructivist approach, we suggest that bottom-up driven implicit flexibility may represent a key prerequisite for the development of efficient explicit cognitive control