Moral Universality in Henry Sidgwick’s Ethics

Abstract

The article analyzes the idea of moral universality in the Henry Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics. It is shown that this idea is the leitmotif of this work. The following implications of moral universality are highlighted: (1) the impartiality of moral philosopher’s position in his research (excluding sermon or edifying); (2) the position of every thinking person while making judgments and decisions: this position is set by the self-evident principles of justice (equality), or an impartial attitude to different people in similar situations, as well as the impartial application of general rules to them; prudence, or an impartial attitude of persons to their own good throughout life; benevolence, or an impartial attitude to the good of different people. (3) the special feature of the self-evident principles themselves, which manifests itself either in the general consent of experts or all people regarding these rules (general acceptance), or in the absence of disagreement. The article concludes that the idea of universality as an objective characteristic of substantial moral principles as their general acceptance is rather vulnerable: none of Sidgwick’s principles meets his criterion of general acceptance. However, the interpretation of universality as impartiality in making decisions and judgments seems quite reliable. The peculiarity of Sidgwick’s position in comparison with Kant's was that he applied a utilitarian approach to the analysis of universality as im­partiality and filled it with substantial points.