Affiliation:
1. 4 Chimes Avenue London England
Abstract
Abstract
This paper offers a fresh examination of a salient distinction located at the beginning of the Affinity Argument between the composite (τὸ σύνθετον) and the incomposite (τὸ ἀσύνθετον). I offer reasons for why Plato may have intended for us to assume that the soul is an incomposite unity in its essential nature. I then substantiate this claim by reviving an ancient interpretation to the Affinity Argument according to which the soul is of the same metaphysical kind as the Forms. I thus suggest that the argument may be seen as supporting the basic indestructibility cum immortality of all souls.
Subject
History and Philosophy of Science,Philosophy
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