Weak Berge Equilibrium in Finite Three-person Games: Conception and Computation-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Weak Berge Equilibrium in Finite Three-person Games: Conception and Computation

Published:2020-12-17 Issue:1 Volume:11 Page:127-134
ISSN:2299-1093
Container-title:Open Computer Science
language:en
Short-container-title:

Author:

Kudryavtsev Konstantin¹,Malkov Ustav²

Affiliation:

1. South Ural State University , Chelyabinsk , Russia

2. Central Economics and Mathematics Institute of Russian Academy of Science , Moscow , Russia

Abstract

Abstract The paper proposes the concept of a weak Berge equilibrium. Unlike the Berge equilibrium, the moral basis of this equilibrium is the Hippocratic Oath “First do no harm”. On the other hand, any Berge equilibrium is a weak Berge equilibrium. But, there are weak Berge equilibria, which are not the Berge equilibria. The properties of the weak Berge equilibrium have been investigated. The existence of the weak Berge equilibrium in mixed strategies has been established for finite games. The weak Berge equilibria for finite three-person non-cooperative games are computed.

Publisher

Walter de Gruyter GmbH

Subject

General Computer Science

Link

https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/comp-2020-0210/pdf

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