How Do Risk-Averse Litigants Set Contingent Fees for Risk-Neutral Lawyers?

Abstract

Abstract We examine a two-stage litigation in which risk-averse litigants set contingent fees strategically for risk-neutral lawyers. In the first stage of the litigation, each litigant sets a fixed fee and a contingent fee for his lawyer. In the second stage, each lawyer exerts effort to win a lawsuit on behalf of the litigant. Employing the subgame-perfect equilibrium as a solution concept, we obtain the following results. First, if a litigant sets a higher rate of contingent fee, then the opponent follows suit and the contingent fee fraction increases in the difference in litigant’s utility between winning and losing the case. Second, changes in a litigant’s initial endowment have different effects on the contingent fee fraction depending upon litigant preferences, while an increase in the prize of the case always increases the contingent fee fraction regardless of litigant preferences.