Affiliation:
1. Trinity University Department of Philosophy San Antonio USA
Abstract
Abstract
Pyrrhonian skeptics, according to Sextus Empiricus, suspend judgment in the face of equally strong oppositions, but they also continue to investigate. This joint characterization has puzzled scholars: Why keep investigating if the evidence demands epochē? On this point, Sextus has been accused of muddled thinking at best and incoherence at worst. In this paper, I explain how investigative activity harmonizes with the suspensive mindset. My interpretation helps to explain several puzzling features of Pyrrhonian philosophy in addition to the idea that one can both suspend judgment and continue investigating.
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