Rethinking Boudon’s Cognitive Rationality in the Light of Mises’ Apriorism and Gadamer’s Hermeneutics

Abstract

AbstractThe purpose of this article is to show that Boudon’s explanation of action in terms of “good reasons” can be philosophically enriched by merging his methodological perspective with Mises’ praxeology and Gadamer’s hermeneutics. In order to develop our goal of merging Boudon’s approach with Mises’ and Gadamer’s, we will focus on two points. The first is the identification of the invariable structure of human action. Unlike Boudon, we suggest that the best way to establish this invariable structure, which makes the explanation of action possible, is not to refer to the controversial concept of “human nature,” but rather to use Mises’ praxeological analysis of the invariable logic which all actions have in common. The second point analyzed in this article is the temporal and cultural dimension of the interpretative process which individuals elaborate to develop their reasons. This point, which is related to hermeneutical philosophy and is not investigated in detail by Boudon, is largely discussed by Gadamer. In our opinion, merging Gadamer’s description of the interpretative process – a process that Gadamer calls “hermeneutical circle” – and Boudon’s sociology of “good reasons” is useful because, unlike Boudon, Gadamer clarifies the epistemological nature of the interpretative process as well as the reasons why this process – which is a trial and error process – allows us to understand the actions of people who belong to different cultures.