Author:
Poyago-Theotoky Joanna,Tampieri Alessandro
Abstract
AbstractWe present a theoretical framework in which an elitist and a non-elitist university in a developed country compete by choosing admission standards and deciding whether or not to open a branch campus in a developing country. Students from a developing country attend university if either a branch campus is opened or, they can afford to move to the developed country. We find that the elitist university is more likely to open a branch campus. This result is reversed if the gain, in terms of prestige, to attend the home campus of the elitist university more than offsets a student’s mobility costs. A rise in the graduate wage increases the incentive for opening a branch campus, although this incentive is stronger for the elitist university.
Subject
General Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Reference20 articles.
1. Competition between Private and Public Schools, Vouchers and Peer-Group Effects;American Economic Review,1998
2. Peer Group Distance and Tuition Fees : When Widening University Participation is Still Better working paper;Carroni
3. The Impact of the GATS on Transnational Tertiary Education: Comparing Experiences of New Zealand, Australia, Singapore and Malaysia;Australian Education Researcher,2003
4. Competition among Universities and the Emergence of the Elite Institution;Bulletin of Economic Research,2002
5. The Effects of a Branch Campus;Education Economics,2010
Cited by
2 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献