1. Let me stress, however, that my book does not purport to be a work of Kant scholarship, let alone of Hegel scholarship. I acknowledge in the preface that my Kant is Strawson's, and Strawson's Kant is no doubt not the real Kant. Hegel figures in my book only as an inspiring figure, largely off-stage.
2. Strictly, as Sedgwick points out, just the conditions involving our forms of sensible intuition—the topics of the Transcendental Aesthetic, cf. p. 234.
3. See e.g. A42/B59, which Sedgwick cites, p. 244, fn.10.
4. Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1983), p. 13. (See my discussion of this passage,Mind and World, p. 43, n.18.)
5. Consider changing one's conception of people of African origin, freeing oneself from the idea that a black skin is a reason to expect, say, criminal behaviour. The language of changing conceptions is tailor-made to imply that concepts stay unchanged.