Balancing the three pillars of stability in Armenia and Georgia

Abstract

Voters care about policy, and this is true for democracies as well as hybrid regimes. To show how the incumbents’ policy choice influences political continuity and change we look at public policies in Armenia and Georgia from 2004 to 2013. We ground the paper in Gerschewski’s [2013. “The Three Pillars of Stability: Legitimation, Repression, and Co-Optation in Autocratic Regimes.” Democratization 20 (1): 13–38] theoretical framework that views legitimation, repression, and co-optation as the three strategies or pillars of stability in less than democratic regimes. We describe each pillar as a set of specific policies designed by ruling parties to gain legitimacy in the eyes of voters, as well as policies aimed at co-optation and/or repression of political opponents. Hence, we demonstrate that the key to the incumbent’s electoral survival is the stabilization process between pillars, i.e. complementary application of policies based on available resources. However, the application of different stabilization strategies is not enough and timing, organization, and balance between pillars are also crucial for maintaining voters’ support for the incumbent. Based on secondary statistical evidence and primary qualitative data analysis we show how the Armenian government managed to balance the pillars of stability by the effective and well-timed application of different policies, while the government of Georgia failed to use relevant pillars of stabilization when one of the pillars did not work to the incumbent’s advantage.