1. Rüdiger Bubner, 'Kant, Transcendental Arguments, and the Problem of the Deduction', Review of Metaphysics, 28 (1975), p. 462.
2. For representative accounts see Dieter Henrich, 'The Proof Structure of Kant's Transcendental Deduction', Review of Metaphysics, 22 (1969), pp. 640-59; Karl Ameriks, 'Kant's Transcendental Deduction as a Regressive Argument', KantStudien, 69 (1978), pp. 273-87; and Paul Guyer, 'The Transcendental Deduction of the Categories', in The Cambridge Companion to Kant, ed. Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 123-60.
3. A. C. Genova, Good Transcendental Arguments', Kant-Studien, 75 (1984), pp. 480, 478.
4. Eckart Förster, 'How are Transcendental Arguments Possible?', in Reading Kant, ed. Eva Schaper and Wilhelm Vossenkuhl (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1989), p. 10.
5. For a concise account of the issues here, see J. N. Mohanty, 'Introductory Essay: On the Possibility of Transcendental Philosophy', in The Possibility of Transcendental Philosophy (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985), pp. xiii-xxxii.