1. The intelligence failure at Pearl Harbor was also seen as reflecting a failure to share information available in only tightly restricted channels. On parallels between the influences of Pearl Harbor and 9/11 on intelligence legislation, see Michael Warner, “Legal Echoes: the National Security Act of 1947 and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,”Stanford Law and Policy Review, Vol. 17 , 2006 .
2. Some of these initiatives have been undertaken through presidential directives and executive orders; for a discussion of the advantages of addressing such issues through legislation, see Gordon Lederman, “National Security Reform for the Twenty-first Century: A New National Security Act and Reflections on Legislation's Role in Organizational Change,”Journal of National Security Law & Policy, Vol. 3 , 2009 .
3. There is a considerable literature about Executive Branch “czars,” and both the DCI and successor DNI could be described as intelligence “czars.” Much of the controversy surrounding the term has focused, however, on charges that the Executive Branch creates czars to avoid congressional accountability. Yet, appointment as DCI always required the advice and consent of the Senate and there was always congressional oversight by both the Senate and the House of Representatives even if it was very limited in many cases. For further background on the issues of “czars,” see Harold C. Relyea, “The Coming of Presidential Czars and Their Accountability to Congress: The Initial Years: 1937–1945,” White House Studies, Vol. 11, 2011; Mitchell A. Sollenberger and Mark J. Rozell, The President's Czars: Undermining Congress and the Constitution (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2012); also the report of the Project on National Security Reform ,Forging a New Shield, November 2008 .
4. Presidential Directive on Coordination of Foreign Intelligence Activities, 22 January 1946, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States [hereafter abbreviated FRUS], 1945–1950 ,Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment( Washington , DC : Government Printing Office , 1996 ), pp. 178 – 179 .
5. The memorandum of 22 January 1946 established a Director of Central Intelligence whose primary responsibility was to provide information to policymakers. The position had no role in guiding or directing the activities of other agencies. See Douglas F. Garthoff,Directors of Central Intelligence as Leaders of the U.S. Intelligence Community, 1946–2005(reprint: Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2007), pp. 12–13. Garthoff, as a CIA historian, prepared the comprehensive and authoritative account of the organizational leadership of the U.S. Intelligence Community that serves, in large measure, as the basis for this study. Another CIA historian, Michael Warner, noted that a July 1946 National Intelligence Authority Directive (NIAD-5) directed the DCI to coordinate all U.S. foreign intelligence activities, “perhaps the most expansive charter ever granted to a Director of Central Intelligence.” It did not, however, give him control of departmental intelligence organizations. Michael Warner, ed.Central Intelligence: Origin and Evolution( Washington , DC : Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency , 2001 ), pp. 3 – 4 .