Affiliation:
1. Department of Economics, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA 02467, and IZA (email: )
Abstract
Can financial incentives resolve the fertility-sex ratio trade-off faced by countries with persistent son preference and easy access to sex-selection technology? An Indian program, Devi Rupak, that seeks to lower fertility and the sex ratio is unable to do so. Although fertility decreases, the sex ratio at birth worsens as high son preference families are unwilling to forgo a son despite substantially higher benefits for a daughter. Thus, financial incentives may only play a limited role in the resolution of the fertility-sex ratio conflict. (JEL I38, J13, J16, J18, O15)
Publisher
American Economic Association
Subject
General Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Cited by
43 articles.
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