Do Workers Comply with Salary History Bans? A Survey on Voluntary Disclosure, Adverse Selection, and Unraveling

Author:

Agan Amanda1,Cowgill Bo2,Gee Laura Katherine3

Affiliation:

1. Rutgers University and NBER (email: )

2. Columbia Business School (email: )

3. Tufts University (email: )

Abstract

Salary history bans forbid employers from asking job candidates to disclose their salaries. However, applicants can still volunteer this information. Our theoretical model predicts that the effect of these laws varies by how workers comply. Our survey of Americans in the labor force finds candidates fall into three compliance types: 25 percent always disclose their salary whether asked or not, 17 percent never disclose, and 58 percent comply with the ban. Importantly, compliance type varies by demographics (e.g. always-disclosers are more male, compliers are more female), and workers are more likely to disclose as others do the same, which suggests unraveling.

Publisher

American Economic Association

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