Affiliation:
1. Northwestern University, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208 (e-mail: )
Abstract
I introduce and study dynamic persuasion mechanisms. A principal privately observes the evolution of a stochastic process and sends messages over time to an agent. The agent takes actions in each period based on her beliefs about the state of the process and the principal wishes to influence the agent’s action. I characterize the optimal persuasion mechanism and show how to derive it in applications. I then consider the extension to multiple agents where higher-order beliefs matter. (JEL D82, D83)
Publisher
American Economic Association
Subject
Economics and Econometrics
Cited by
156 articles.
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