Near-Feasible Stable Matchings with Couples-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Near-Feasible Stable Matchings with Couples

Published:2018-11-01 Issue:11 Volume:108 Page:3154-3169
ISSN:0002-8282
Container-title:American Economic Review
language:en
Short-container-title:American Economic Review

Author:

Nguyen Thành¹,Vohra Rakesh²

Affiliation:

1. Krannert School of Management, Purdue University, 403 W. State Street, West Lafayette, IN 47906 (email: )

2. Economics Department, University of Pennsylvania, 451 McNeil Building 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104 (email: )

Abstract

The National Resident Matching program seeks a stable matching of medical students to teaching hospitals. With couples, stable matchings need not exist. Nevertheless, for any student preferences, we show that each instance of a matching problem has a “nearby” instance with a stable matching. The nearby instance is obtained by perturbing the capacities of the hospitals. In this perturbation, aggregate capacity is never reduced and can increase by at most four. The capacity of each hospital never changes by more than two. (JEL C78, D47, I11, J41, J44)

Publisher

American Economic Association

Subject

Economics and Econometrics

Link

https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdf/10.1257/aer.20141188

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