Efficient Entry in Competing Auctions-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Efficient Entry in Competing Auctions

Published:2014-10-01 Issue:10 Volume:104 Page:3288-3296
ISSN:0002-8282
Container-title:American Economic Review
language:en
Short-container-title:American Economic Review

Author:

Albrecht James¹,Gautier Pieter A.²,Vroman Susan³

Affiliation:

1. Department of Economics, Georgetown University, Washington, DC 20057 (e-mail: )

2. Department of Economics, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands (e-mail: )

3. Department of Economics, Georgetown University, Washington, DC 20057 (e-mail: ).

Abstract

In this paper, we demonstrate the efficiency of seller entry in a model of competing auctions in which we allow for both buyer and seller heterogeneity. This generalizes existing efficiency results in the competitive search literature by simultaneously allowing for nonrival (many-on-one) meetings and private information. (JEL D44, D82)

Publisher

American Economic Association

Subject

Economics and Econometrics

Link

https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdf/10.1257/aer.104.10.3288

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