Affiliation:
1. Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, 655 Knight Way, Stanford, CA 94305.
2. Becker Friedman Institute, University of Chicago, 1126 East 59th Street, Chicago, IL 60637.
Abstract
We introduce a model in which firms trade goods via bilateral contracts which specify a buyer, a seller, and the terms of the exchange. This setting subsumes (many-to-many) matching with contracts, as well as supply chain matching. When firms' relationships do not exhibit a supply chain structure, stable allocations need not exist. By contrast, in the presence of supply chain structure, a natural substitutability condition characterizes the maximal domain of firm preferences for which stable allocations are guaranteed to exist. Furthermore, the classical lattice structure, rural hospitals theorem, and one-sided strategy-proofness results all generalize to this setting. (JEL C78, D85, D86, L14)
Publisher
American Economic Association
Subject
General Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Cited by
82 articles.
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