Secret-free security: a survey and tutorial

Abstract

Abstract“Classical keys,” i.e., secret keys stored permanently in digital form in nonvolatile memory, appear indispensable in modern computer security—but also constitute an obvious attack target in any hardware containing them. This contradiction has led to perpetual battle between key extractors and key protectors over the decades. It is long known that physical unclonable functions (PUFs) can at least partially overcome this issue, since they enable secure hardware without the above classical keys. Unfortunately, recent research revealed that many standard PUFs still contain other types of “secrets” deeper in their physical structure, whose disclosure to adversaries breaks security as well: Examples include the manufacturing variations in SRAM PUFs, the power-up states of SRAM PUFs, or the signal delays in Arbiter PUFs. Most of these secrets have already been extracted in viable attacks in the past, breaking PUF-security in practice. A second generation of physical security primitives now shows potential to resolve this remaining problem, however. In certain applications, so-called Complex PUFs, SIMPLs/PPUFs, and UNOs are able to realize not just hardware that is free of classical keys in the above sense, but completely “secret-free” instead. In the resulting hardware systems, adversaries could hypothetically be allowed to inspect every bit and every atom, and learn any information present in any form in the system,withoutbeing able to break security. Secret-free hardware would hence promise to be innately and permanently immune against any physical or malware-based key-extraction: There simply is no security–critical information to extract anymore. Our survey and tutorial paper takes the described situation as starting point, and categorizes, formalizes, and overviews the recently evolving area ofsecret-free security. We propose the attempt of making hardware completely secret-free as promising endeavor in future hardware designs, at least in those application scenarios where this is logically possible. In others, we suggest that secret-free techniques could be combined with standard PUFs and classical methods to construct hybrid systems with notably reduced attack surfaces.