1. Cf. ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Erdemovic, 7 October 1997, Joint Separate Opinion of Judges McDonald and Vohrah, para. 78: “It is clear to us that whatever is the distinction between the international legal order and municipal legal orders in general, the distinction is imperfect in respect of the criminal law which, both at the international and the municipal level, is directed towards consistent aims.” See also Stein 1994, p. 450 (cited above, note 934) and Lauterpacht 1944, p. 64 (“In no other sphere does the view that international law is binding only upon States and not upon individuals lead to more paradoxical consequences and nowhere has it in practice been rejected more emphatically than in the domain of the laws of war.”).
2. It should be noted at the outset that none of the characteristics to be mentioned here is in itself unique for core crimes law. The goal here is to analyze whether and to what extent the framework of implementation of core crimes law differs from international law’s general framework, not to what extent core crimes law can be distinguished from other particular fields of international law. Certainly, there are other fields for which the viability of the general framework of implementation may be questioned, in part for similar reasons as those set out here.
3. See above, p. 10.
4. See on the implications of this point, above, Chapter IV, para. 5.3.a.
5. See Burke-White 2002, p. 76-77; Triffterer 1966, p. 180-181.