Abstract
AbstractMany classic social preference (multiwinner social choice) correspondences are resolute only when two alternatives and an odd number of individuals are considered. Thus, they generally admit several resolute refinements, each of them naturally interpreted as a tie-breaking rule. A tie-breaking rule is compulsory every time a single final decision is needed. Unfortunately, using a tie-breaking rule on some social preference (multiwinner social choice) correspondence can dramatically compromise its properties. In particular, very often, the arithmetic relation between the number of alternatives and the number of voters does not allow to maintain both anonymity and neutrality. In those cases, the only possibility is to look at suitable different forms of symmetry that are coherent with the decision context. We find out conditions which make a social preference (multiwinner social choice) correspondence admit a resolute refinement fulfilling some weak versions of the anonymity and neutrality principles. We also clear when it is possible to obtain, for those resolute refinements, the reversal symmetry (immunity to the reversal bias). The theory we develop turns out to be useful in many common applicative contexts and allows to explicitly construct those refinements.
Funder
Università degli Studi di Firenze
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
General Economics, Econometrics and Finance,Finance
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