Abstract
AbstractThe quantity-setting (Cournot) oligopoly with perfect complements is dual to the price-setting (Betrand) oligopoly with homogeneous goods. Under mild technical conditions the former setting has a unique (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium with null quantities. As an implication, the provision of perfectly complementary goods might actually be impossible, if the market is not either perfectly competitive or monopolized.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
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