On the least square prenucleolus for games with externalities-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

On the least square prenucleolus for games with externalities

Published:2024-05-22 Issue: Volume: Page:
ISSN:1862-4472
Container-title:Optimization Letters
language:en
Short-container-title:Optim Lett

Author:

Fiestras-Janeiro M. G.,Saavedra-Nieves A.

Abstract

AbstractIn this paper we address the problem of determining the least square prenucleolus for games with externalities. Specifically, this solution is based on the minimization of the variance of the excess vectors that can be associated to any allocation vector over the set of all embedded coalitions using a least square criterion. From a theoretical point of view, an axiomatization of this solution is provided. Besides, we analyse its relations with other proposals of solution in the game-theoretical literature.

Funder

Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación

Xunta de Galicia

Universidade de Vigo

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Link

https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s11590-024-02122-z.pdf

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