1. This could be approached from a different angle, in that positivism and realism are based on epistemological and methodological assumptions that there is continuity between humans and ‘nature’. This means that in principle the same or similar procedures are appropriate to their investigation. See M. Williams, Science and Social Science: An Introduction (London: Routledge, 2000) pp. 47–51.
2. The ‘hegemony of social constructionism’ is discussed in T. Lovell, ‘Feminisms of the Second Wave’, in B. S. Turner (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Social Theory, 2nd edn (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000) pp. 305–8. Lovell, somewhat ironically, equates being a ‘good sociologist’ with denying ‘any role to biology’ (p. 311). For a balanced introduction to the muddles into which we have talked ourselves over biology, sex and gender, see L. Segal, Why Feminism? Gender, Psychology and Politics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999). For an understanding of disability which downplays organic embodiment, see C. Barnes, G. Mercer and T. Shakespeare, Exploring Disability: A Sociological Introduction (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999) pp. 10–38.
3. T. Eagleton, The Idea of Culture (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000) p. 88.
4. E.g. B. Adam, Timescapes of Modernity: The Environment and Invisible Hazards (London: Routledge, 1998); U. Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (London: Sage, 1992); D. Goldblatt, Social Theory and the Environment (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996); P. MacNaghten and J. Urry, ‘Towards a Sociology of Nature’, Sociology, vol. 29 (1995) pp. 203–20; S. Yearley, Sociology, Environmentalism, Globalization: Reinventing the Globe (London: Sage, 1996).
5. M. S. Archer, Being Human: The Problem of Agency (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000);