Tip-of-the-Tongue Experiences as Cognitive Phenomenology

Abstract

AbstractWhether metacognitive experiences should be considered evidence for or against cognitive phenomenology is controversial. In this paper I analyze one metacognitive experience, having a word at the tip of one’s tongue, and argue that this experience is an instance of cognitive phenomenology. I develop what I call a Cognitive view of tip-of-the-tongue (TOT) experience, supported by examining the prominent psychological explanation of tip-of-the-tongue states emerging from the science of language production, showing how psychological data suggests that the phenomenal character of tip-of-the-tongue experiences is constituted in part by conceptual representations, from which it follows that tip-of-the-tongue experiences are instances of cognitive phenomenology. This view contrasts with metacognitive embodied affect views of tip-of-the-tongue experiences, and I provide several clarifications and challenges that defenders of these views would have to address to situate their views within the cognitive phenomenology debate. Ultimately, I conclude that the Cognitive view of TOT is better supported by empirical data, and comports better with introspection, in comparison to embodied affect views.