Abstract
AbstractIn recent years an increasing number of political philosophers have begun to ground their arguments in empirical evidence. I investigate this novel approach by way of example. The object of my case study is David Miller’s renewed empirical argument for a needs-based principle of justice. First, I introduce Miller’s argument. Then I raise four worries about the application of his methodology that give rise to corresponding general recommendations for how to do empirical political philosophy. Proponents of this approach should take care to (1) check for inappropriately narrow (and broad) samples, (2) verify studies’ relevance for their empirical hypotheses, (3) adjust their confidence to the available empirical evidence, and (4) properly integrate their hypotheses into their philosophical theorizing.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Reference112 articles.
1. Adriaans, J., Eisnecker, P. S., & Liebig, S. (2019). A comparison of earnings justice throughout Europe: Widespread approval in Germany for income distribution according to need and equity. DIW Weekly Report, 44(45), 397–404.
2. Aguiar, F., Becker, A., & Miller, L. (2013). Whose impartiality? An experimental study of veiled stakeholders, involved spectators and detached observers. Economics & Philosophy, 29(2), 155–174.
3. Allard, A., & Cova, F. (2023). Viciana, H., Aguiar, F., & Gaitan, A. T. (Eds.). Issues in experimental moral philosophy. Routledge.
4. Baderin, A. (2017). Reflective equilibrium: Individual or public? Social Theory and Practice, 43(1), 1–28.
5. Baderin, A. (2018). Prioritizing principles. Contemporary Political Theory, 17(1), 71–77.