A naturalist approach to social ontology

Abstract

AbstractI argue that a certain kind of naturalist approach to social ontology is likely to be both philosophically fruitful and relevant to empirical social science. The kind of naturalism I employ might be called contextualism, which emphasizes the constant presence of assumed background knowledge, is suspicious of general inference rules and all or nothing claims about the ontology of the social sciences, and argues that Quine’s quantificational criterion for ontological commitment has to be supplemented with local interpretations and arguments about what specific social science research is committed to. I look at three case studies employing this perspective, one on agent based models and individualism, a second on the reality of social class, and a third on the reality of race. In all three cases work is first needed to clarifying what empirical social science is claiming, what ontology or ontologies it seems to presuppose, and then description of the kinds of evidence that supports its commitments.