Abstract
AbstractWithin the secular and still ongoing discussion about truth, what is by now known as alethic pluralism has proved to be one of the most interesting proposals advanced in the field. Indeed, from the last decade of the last century onwards, the field of theories about truth has been enriched with the idea that truth is not only one but also many—many alethically potent properties that differently characterise different domains of discourse. Moreover, thirty or so years of discussions have also shown that alethic pluralism itself is many rather than one—a family of views with different metaphysical commitments. As it may happen in all good families, though, some members are neglected or overshadowed. This is the case with the view called “simple alethic pluralism”, and this paper seeks to remedy this. Accordingly, a new kind of simple alethic pluralism (termed “Plain Alethic Pluralism”) is advanced. It highlights the features of the meaning of the word “true”, in particular its focal meaning, while reaffirming the dependence of truth on the world. In drawing attention to the way speakers use the truth-predicate, making it acquire the meaning it has, it intends to qualify as a conception of truth with a human face.
Funder
Università degli Studi di Sassari
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
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