Abstract
AbstractAccording to methodological anti-exceptionalism, logic follows a scientific methodology. There has been some discussion about which methodology logic has. Authors such as Priest, Hjortland and Williamson have argued that logic can be characterized by an abductive methodology. We choose the logical theory that behaves better under a set of epistemic criteria (such as fit to data, simplicity, fruitfulness, or consistency). In this paper, I analyze some important discussions in the philosophy of logic (intuitionism versus classical logic, semantic paradoxes, and the meaning of conditionals), and I show that they presuppose different methodologies, involving different notions of evidence and different epistemic values. I argue that, rather than having a specific methodology such as abductivism, logic can be characterized by methodological pluralism. This position can also be seen as the application of scientific pluralism to the realm of logic.
Funder
Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
General Social Sciences,Philosophy
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