A credence-based theory-heavy approach to non-human consciousness

Abstract

AbstractMany different methodological approaches have been proposed to infer the presence of consciousness in non-human systems. In this paper, a version of the theory-heavy approach is defended. Theory-heavy approaches rely heavily on considerations from theories of consciousness to make inferences about non-human consciousness. Recently, the theory-heavy approach has been critiqued in the form of Birch’s (Noûs 56(1):133–153, 2022) dilemma of demandingness and Shevlin’s (Mind Lang 36(2):297–314, 2021) specificity problem. However, both challenges implicitly assume an inapt characterization of the theory-heavy approach. I argue that an alternative characterization of the approach, what I call a credence-based theory-heavy approach, avoids these challenges. Theorists can generate interpretations of their theory, at different levels of generality, and operationalize these into theory-informed markers. These theory-informed markers are assigned a likelihood and are used to assess the probability that a target system is conscious. In providing this characterization, and mapping out the possible ways in which a credence-based theory-heavy approach can be fleshed out, the aim is to situate the theory-heavy approach as a more compelling approach than it is currently being perceived as. Our attention, then, needs to shift towards remaining challenges such as the consensus problem and the problem of calibrating the likelihoods associated with theory-informed markers. I also explore methodological pluralism and assess how the credence-based theory-heavy approach can benefit from other methodological approaches.