Abstract
AbstractVirtue Reliabilism holds that knowledge is a cognitive achievement—an epistemic success that is creditable to the cognitive abilities of the knowing subject. Beyond this consensus, there is much disagreement amongst proponents of virtue reliabilism about the conditions under which the credit-relation between an epistemic success and a person’s cognitive abilities holds. This paper aims to establish a new and attractive view of this crucial relation in terms of difference-making. We will argue that the resulting theory, Difference-Making Virtue Epistemology, can deal with cases of epistemic luck and testimonial knowledge while revealing the common core of knowledge and other achievements.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
General Social Sciences,Philosophy
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