1. See M. Buti, S. Eijffinger, D. Franco: Revisiting the Stability and Growth Pact: Grand Design or Internal Adjustment?, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3692, 2002.
2. Ibid. See M. Buti, S. Eijffinger, D. Franco: Revisiting the Stability and Growth Pact: Grand Design of Internal Adjustment?, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3692, 2002.
3. See J. Frankel, A. Rose: The Endogeneity of the Optimum Currency Area Criteria, in: Economic Journal, Vol. 108, 1998, pp. 1009–25.
4. M. Buti, B. Martinot: Open Issues in the Implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact, in: National Institute Economic Review, Vol. 174, 2000, pp. 92–104; S. Korkman: Fiscal Policy Coordination in EMU: Should it Go Beyond the SGP?, in: A. Brunlla, M. Buti, D. Franco (eds.): The Stability and Growth Pact — The Architecture of Fiscal Policy in EMU, Basingstoke 2001, Palgrave, pp. 287–310.
5. As shown in M. Buti, A. Sapir (eds): Economic Policy in EMU, Oxford 1998, Oxford University Press, budgetary consolidation in Germany, France and Italy — three of the countries which did not meet the close-to-balance rule of the SGP — was considerably worse than the already timid efforts which were planned in their stability programmes. This contrasts sharply with the rest of the euro area members whose budgetary out-turn was better than planned.