Natural kind terms again-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Natural kind terms again

Published:2021-01-05 Issue:1 Volume:11 Page:
ISSN:1879-4912
Container-title:European Journal for Philosophy of Science
language:en
Short-container-title:Euro Jnl Phil Sci

Author:

Raatikainen Panu^ORCID

Abstract

AbstractThe new externalist picture of natural kind terms due to Kripke, Putnam, and others has become quite popular in philosophy. Many philosophers of science have remained sceptical. Häggqvist and Wikforss have recently criticised this view severely. They contend it depends essentially on a micro-essentialist view of natural kinds that is widely rejected among philosophers of science, and that a scientifically reasonable metaphysics entails the resurrection of some version of descriptivism. It is argued in this paper that the situation is not quite as dark for the new theory of reference as many critics suggest. There are several distinct questions here which should not be conflated and ought to be dealt with one by one. Descriptivism remains arguably problematic.

Funder

Tampere University including Tampere University Hospital, Tampere University of Applied Sciences

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

History and Philosophy of Science,Philosophy

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s13194-020-00344-3.pdf

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