Product Liability and Strategic Delegation: Endogenous Manager Incentives Promote Strict Liability-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Product Liability and Strategic Delegation: Endogenous Manager Incentives Promote Strict Liability

Published:2022-04-27 Issue:2 Volume:61 Page:149-169
ISSN:0889-938X
Container-title:Review of Industrial Organization
language:en
Short-container-title:Rev Ind Organ

Author:

Friehe Tim,Pham Cat Lam,Miceli Thomas J.^ORCID

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

Management of Technology and Innovation,Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management,Strategy and Management,Economics and Econometrics

Link

https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s11151-022-09870-1.pdf

Reference35 articles.

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3. Baumann, F., & Friehe, T. (2021). Product safety and harm-mitigation incentives when mitigation lowers consumption benefits. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 37, 198–237.

4. Baumann, F., Friehe, T., & Rasch, A. (2018). Product liability in markets for vertically differentiated products. American Law and Economics Review, 20, 46–81.

5. Chen, Y., & Hua, X. (2017). Competition, product safety, and product liability. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 33, 237–267.

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