Abstract
AbstractIn this paper, I challenge the distinction between “epistemic” and “ontic” states propounded by Harrigan and Spekkens (Found Phys 40:125–157, 2010) by pointing out that because knowledge is factive, any state that represents someone’s knowledge about a physical system thereby also represents something about the physical system itself, so there is no such thing as “mere knowledge”. This criticism leads to the reformulation of the main question of the debate: instead of asking whether a given state is ontic or epistemic, we should instead ask whether a given change of a state is ontic or epistemic. In particular, in the context of quantum mechanics, one can ask whether the collapse of the quantum state could be understood as an epistemically successful change of the observer’s beliefs about the complete state of the system that is not associated with any change in the physical reality. I argue that the answer to this question should be in the negative because it is possible that, in a series of measurements, the collapse rule tells us to update a certain state to a different one and then back to the same state; if both of these updates are merely changes of our beliefs, then they could not both be epistemically successful.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
General Physics and Astronomy
Cited by
2 articles.
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