And the Loser Is… Plurality Voting-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

And the Loser Is… Plurality Voting

Published:2011-10-28 Issue: Volume: Page:327-351
ISSN:1614-0311
Container-title:Studies in Choice and Welfare
language:
Short-container-title:

Author:

Laslier Jean-François

Publisher

Springer Berlin Heidelberg

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/978-3-642-20441-8_13.pdf

Reference35 articles.

1. Aleskerov, F. & Kubanov, E. (1999). A degree of manipulability of known social choice procedures. In S. Aliprantis, A. Alkan, & N. Yannelis (Eds.), Studies in economic theory (Vol. 8), Current trends in economics: Theory and applications (pp. 13–28). Berlin: Springer.

2. Arrow, K. J. (1951). Social choices and individual values. New York: Wiley.

3. Arrow, K. J., Sen, A. K., & Suzumura, K. (2002). Handbook of social choice and welfare (Vol. 1). Amsterdam: Elsevier.

4. Balinski, M. & Laraki, R. (2007). A theory of measuring, electing, and ranking. PNAS, 104, 8720–8725.

5. Basset, G. W. & Persky, J. (1999). Robust voting. Public Choice, 99, 299–310.

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