Abstract
AbstractIn this paper, we consider constrained discounted stochastic games with a countably generated state space and norm continuous transition probability having a density function. We prove existence of approximate stationary equilibria and stationary weak correlated equilibria. Our results imply the existence of stationary Nash equilibrium in ARAT stochastic games.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
Applied Mathematics,Control and Optimization
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