Abstract
AbstractLaw enforcement officials face numerous decisions regarding their enforcement choices. One important decision, that is often controversial, is the amount of knowledge that law enforcement distributes to the community regarding their policing strategies. Assuming the goal is to minimize criminal activity (alternatively, maximize citation rates), our theoretical analysis suggests that agencies should reveal (shroud) their resource allocation if criminals are uncertainty seeking, and shroud (reveal) their allocation if criminals are uncertainty averse. We run a laboratory experiment to test our theoretical framework, and find that enforcement behavior is approximately optimal given the observed non-expected utility uncertainty preferences of criminals.
Funder
Krannert School of Management, Purdue University
Australian National University
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)
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