Abstract
AbstractWe study minimal conditions for competitive behavior with few agents. We adapt a price-quantity strategic market game to the indivisible commodity environment commonly used in double auction experiments, and show that all Nash equilibrium outcomes with active trading are competitive if and only if there are at least two buyers and two sellers willing to trade at every competitive price. Unlike previous formulations, this condition can be verified directly by checking the set of competitive equilibria. In laboratory experiments, the condition we provide turns out to be enough to induce competitive results, and the Nash equilibrium appears to be a good approximation for market outcomes. Subjects, although possessing limited information, are able to act as if complete information were available in the market.
Funder
Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science, George Mason University
European University Institute - Fiesole
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)
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