The maximin support method: an extension of the D’Hondt method to approval-based multiwinner elections-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

The maximin support method: an extension of the D’Hondt method to approval-based multiwinner elections

Published:2022-04-29 Issue: Volume: Page:
ISSN:0025-5610
Container-title:Mathematical Programming
language:en
Short-container-title:Math. Program.

Author:

Sánchez-Fernández Luis^ORCID,Fernández-García Norberto^ORCID,Fisteus Jesús A.^ORCID,Brill Markus^ORCID

Abstract

AbstractWe propose the maximin support method, a novel extension of the D’Hondt apportionment method to approval-based multiwinner elections. The maximin support method is a sequential procedure that aims to maximize the voter support of the least supported elected candidate. It can be computed efficiently and satisfies (adjusted versions of) the main properties of the original D’Hondt method: house monotonicity, population monotonicity, and proportional representation. We also establish a close relationship between the maximin support method and alternative D’Hondt extensions due to Phragmén.

Funder

Agencia Estatal de Investigación

Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung

Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft

Comunidad de Madrid

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

General Mathematics,Software

Link

https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10107-022-01805-8.pdf

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