Abstract
AbstractOf importance when selecting a voting method is whether, on a regular basis, its outcomes accurately capture the intent of voters. A surprise is that very few procedures do this. Another desired feature is for a decision approach to assist groups in reaching a consensus (Sect. 5). As described, these goals are satisfied only with the Borda count. Addressing these objectives requires understanding what can go wrong, what causes voting difficulties, and how bad they can be. To avoid technicalities, all of this is illustrated with examples accompanied by references for readers wishing a complete analysis. As shown (Sects. 1–3), most problems reflect a loss of vital information. Understanding this feature assists in showing that the typical description of Arrow’s Theorem, “with three or more alternatives, no voting method is fair,” is not accurate (Sect. 2).
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
Law,Economics and Econometrics,Philosophy,Sociology and Political Science
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