Acceptable and predominant correlated equilibria-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Acceptable and predominant correlated equilibria

Published:1986-09 Issue:3 Volume:15 Page:133-154
ISSN:0020-7276
Container-title:International Journal of Game Theory
language:en
Short-container-title:Int J Game Theory

Author:

Myerson R. B.

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty,Economics and Econometrics,Social Sciences (miscellaneous),Mathematics (miscellaneous),Statistics and Probability

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/BF01769254.pdf

Reference20 articles.

1. Aumann RJ (1974) Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies. Journal of Mathematical Economics 1:67–96

2. Bernheim D (1984) Rationalizable strategic behavior. Econometrica 52:1007–1028

3. van Damme EEC (1981) Regular equilibrium points ofn-person games in normal form. Eindhoven Institute of Technology discussion paper. To appear in Mathematics of Operations Research

4. van Damme EEC (1983) Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept. Springer, Berlin

5. Farrell J (1983) Communication in games. MIT discussion paper

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