Refugee Matching as a Market Design Application-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Refugee Matching as a Market Design Application

Published:2019 Issue: Volume: Page:445-450
ISSN:2510-3970
Container-title:The Future of Economic Design
language:
Short-container-title:

Author:

Andersson Tommy

Publisher

Springer International Publishing

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/978-3-030-18050-8_62

Reference14 articles.

1. Abdulkadiroğlu, A., & Sönmez, T. (2003). School choice - A mechanism design approach. American Economic Review, 93, 729–747.

2. Andersson, T., & Ehlers, L. (2016). Assigning refugees to landlords in Sweden: Efficient stable maximum matchings. Lund University Department of Economics Working Paper 2016:18.

3. Andersson, T., Ehlers, L., & Martinello, A. (2018). Dynamic refugee matching. Lund University Department of Economics Working Paper 2018:7.

4. Aziz, H., Chen, J., Gaspers, S., & Sun Z. (2017). Stability and Pareto optimality in refugee allocation matchings. Working Paper.

5. Bansak, K., Ferwerda, J., Hainmueller, J., Dillon, A., Hangartner, D., & Lawrence, D. (2018). Improving refugee integration through data-driven algorithmic assignment. Science, 359, 325–329.

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